FNQB: Winning with Bad Offensive Lines, and the Chicago Bears

The offensive line is the defensive unit of an offense.  The rules of football make this the case.  Fundamentally, football offense is six players who are allowed to move the ball through deception, speed, power, or precision.  The defense is allowed to play with 11 guys, and since 11 guys would stop 6 guys pretty easily, it’s the other five who determine the success or failure of the entire unit.  Or something like that.

One piece of conventional wisdom that seems to hold true throughout the years is that if the offensive line is poor at doing it’s job, there’s not a lot that can be done with the other six players to sustain offense over a long period of time.  This has been extrapolated by some writers to the belief that offensive efficiency and offensive line efficiency always correlate perfectly.  That’s not so much true.  Once we ascend to the above league-average levels of offensive efficiency, the determinate of greater success tend to be more related to the synergies between a quarterback, his receivers, and his coaching staff.  There are situational advantages to having a dominating offensive line over an adequate one, making these synergies stronger, but great teams have great players on and off the offensive line.

This article will not focus on those synergies.  This article will look at the teams that have managed to enjoy great success with poor performers on the offensive lines.  A bad offensive line is not a rarity: you can look at any really bad offense, and you’ll find that the offensive lines struggles are paramount to the failure of the unit.  What’s rare is to see a really poor performing line, and a team that wins in spite of it.

Roughly two teams per year make the playoffs with a poor performing offensive line since 2005, meaning that competency on the OL is a common factor with about 83% of the last 60 teams to clinch a playoff berth.  That number is a lot higher if you throw out the contributions of the NFC West division, which has featured four bad offensive lines since Seattle’s broke down a half-decade ago.  The division has been won by the Seahawks and Cardinals every year since the Rams last won it in 2003.

Offensive line performance can be bad for any number of reasons.  Look at the Pittburgh Steelers.  While no one thinks they have an excellent group of offensive linemen, but the reason they rank up near the top of the league in sack rate every year is because of Ben Roethlisberger, and the way he tries to move the ball.  The Steelers offensive line has been on many a list of poor performing lines, but I’m not sure it would really be accurate to characterize the Steelers as a team that wins in spite of their offensive line.  Often, they’ll have to win in spite of their entire offense.  But over the decade, it’s been a joint effort from the offense and defense to win two championships and make the playoffs 7 out of the last 10 years, which includes 2010.

The inspiration of this article — the 2010 Chicago Bears — have no such claim to offensive competency.  That didn’t matter last Monday, when Chicago blew out Minnesota on the road, and clinched the NFC North for the first time since 2006.  They put up 33 offensive points against the Vikings mostly with a quick passing game and runs that hit the defense quickly.  The Bears still do a lot of schematic things to protect their offensive line from itself.  And since the Bears dropped to 4-3 in Week 7 prior to the bye, they’ve been very successful on the offensive side of the ball, all things considered.  The team is 6-1 after the bye, and that’s not a cheap 6-1 either.  Not bad for a team that appeared (and was) incredibly fortunate to be anything else besides 2-5 at the bye week.

It’s not rare for a team to improve in the second half of the year the way the Bears have.  What is rare is for an offensive line to perform like the Bears did over the course of the season, and for them to still win the division.  The Bears are one of only two teams with five wins and no losses in their division, and they did it in a brutal pass rushing division (NFC North), while playing against another great pass rushing division (NFC East), and shut out yet another great pass rushing team (Miami).  The Bears skirted all year around great mismatches on the lines, and had zero offensive consistency all year.  But at the end of the season, things don’t look so horrible for a Bears offense that still ranks very low in most measures, but is finding ways to score a bunch of points with or without the help of the defense and special times.

I set out to find out whether something similar has every been done before, whether a team has ever made the postseason with a line that performed as poorly as the Bears line did in 2010.  Quickly: I’ll point out that there’s a difference between a poor performing offensive line, and a line that performs adequately even though it’s vastly outmatched.  The latter is a good way to describe the 2010 Indianapolis Colts.  That’s a weak group, but it performs well because the Colts receivers and quarterback know exactly what they need to do to ensure Peyton Manning is never sacked: get the ball out quickly, and never, ever run it.  The Bears OL doesn’t do that.  It has accomplishments in spite of its performance.  That’s a key difference.

Do the results suggest teams are becoming more adept at succeeding despite no running lanes, and all sorts of pressure on the quarterback?  They are inconclusive, but interesting nonetheless.

A list of offensive protection units similar to that of the Bears’ this year would be a list of really bad offensive teams.  The Bears are a bad offensive team.  They are not the 2008 Lions, the line most recently as bad as Chicago’s is right now.  Other really bad lines of recent would include the 2007 Chiefs, the 2006 Lions, the 2006 Raiders, the 2005 49ers, 2005 Vikings, and well, the 2004 Bears.  Those seven teams averaged fewer than 4 wins per year.  Only the 2005 Vikings managed a winning record, until this Bears team, which could end up winning twelve games.

The Vikings appeared to make it to 9-7 mostly as a product of improved fortune.  Improved offense behind the passing of Brad Johnson certainly helped, but overall, incredibly fortunate.  Most recent teams just haven’t been able to win with poor performing offensive lines.

Conversely, what if we look with the best teams in the last five years with poorly performing offensive lines (though, obviously, not quite as bad as the Chicago line).  The Steelers show up on there twice in 2007 and 2008.  The post-Hutchinson Seahawks show up there twice in 2007 and 2008.  The 2009 Packers struggled to protect the quarterback.  Past them, one needs to go all the way back to the 2003 Ravens to find a playoff team with an offensive line that could not protect it’s quarterback.

There was one team to make the postseason with a line as dreadful as the Chicago Bears: the amazing 1999 Detroit Lions.  That was the first year after Barry Sanders retired, and the Lions had no ability to run the ball featuring Greg Hill behind this line.  But Gus Frerotte had an amazing season throwing the football when he was healthy, and Charlie Batch also had the best year of his career.  Plus the Lions only got to 8-8.  One year before that, the Atlanta Falcons made the super bowl, losing to the Denver Broncos there.  That offensive line isn’t remembered as poor because of all the records that RB Jamaal Anderson set that year, but that team couldn’t protect it’s quarterback, which is one of the many reasons Anderson continued to get carries.

Clearly, winning teams with epically bad offensive lines come around about twice a decade.  The Bears may just be one of every one-hundred or one-hundred fifty football teams that can win in spite of it’s offensive line.  Both the 1999 Lions and the 2005 Vikings did a better job creating offense than this Bears team did, but the Bears are winning this year how they have always been able to win: special teams and strong defense.  This is not a great Bears team, but it’s a good one.  I feel safe saying that they’ve already won more games in a season than any team with an offensive line this bad in the last twenty years.

Their defense (ranked 4th in DVOA) and special teams (ranked 1st) are good enough for the Chicago Bears to make a run at the super bowl this year.  Winning it all with this group of offensive linemen would be completely unprecedented, even by the 2008 Steelers, who scored defensively in the playoffs in both the AFC Championship and the Super Bowl.  Of course, the Steelers super bowl hopes came down to one last drive by it’s offense.  Sure, that offense instantly became the worst to ever win the championship on a game winning drive, but they were a little bit stronger up front than the Bears currently are.

An examination of the other teams with offensive line struggles similar to those of the 2010 Bears reveals a bunch of teams that either improved on offense as they were going into the postseason, or they missed the playoffs, or they exited very quietly and rather unimpressive, remaining an afterthought.  There are a number of narratives under which this Bears team could hoist the Lombardi trophy, either the line made a vast and unexpected improvement, or Jay Cutler’s recent mastery of Mike Martz’ offense becomes a competency, or Devin Hester goes on an epic run of return touchdowns, letting the defense and running game do the rest.  Knowing Martz, it’s not going to be that last one.  Either he’s going to learn to trust his offensive line, or the Bears will figure to win in spite of no blocking, or the Bears will lose.  Quickly.  I think the majority opinion among pundits around the NFL is of that last option.

Winning a playoff game and making a run isn’t out of the question, especially with the Bears very much in play for a bye in the playoffs.  Cutler can protect his offensive line the way Brett Favre was able to in last year’s playoffs.  The Bears can still become a ground team using the weather conditions to their advantage.  Devin Hester can provide whatever offense they may need off defensive stops.  Robbie Gould, who hasn’t had to do much with the offense creating long TD drives, is still an accurate bad-weather kicker.  Traditionally, however, teams built like the Bears tend to exit very quietly from the postseason, looking always as if they never expected to be there in the first place.  In that sense, this team may be different from all the other weak offensive teams that fizzled out once they reached the bright lights of the playoffs.

Even though the Bears made the playoffs in an extremely improbable manner — division champs without showing they can do the most fundamental of offensive skills — they’ll have every chance to make these playoffs count for them.  Even so, the Bears feature the worst offensive line production of any playoff team in the last 10 years, and of any division winner, perhaps ever.  Eight wins may be the high water mark for a team who blocked as poorly as the Bears for the entirety of a season, and this team that is already 2 wins beyond that mark.  They’ve spit on the notion that teams must be built out from the offensive line.  While touchdown scoring always seems like a bit of a accident from this team, yet, the scores are coming in bunches.  Even if you’re not a fan of the Bears, try to appreciate the rarity of what they’ve accomplished.

FNQB: Has Jason Campbell Regressed or Have His Teammates Regressed?

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Tonight, LiveBall Sports is investigating a curious case of a quarterback becoming progressively less effective from his mid to late 20’s.  In October of 2008, Jason Campbell and the Redskins won 6 of their first 8 games, and sat just a game behind the first place Giants in the NFC East.  It was prior to the ninth game of the season that ESPN Monday Night Football Color Analyst Ron Jaworski called Campbell the NFL’s MVP in the first half of the season.  My initial take on Jaworski’s take was that Campbell had played at an MVP level, but that Jaworski was underestimating the amount of help he was receiving from players like Chris Samuels, Pete Kendall, Clinton Portis, Mike Sellers, Santana Moss, Chris Cooley, and Antwaan Randle El.

The 2008 Redskins had four pro-bowlers from the offensive side, which did not include Campbell.  The 2009 Redskins, of course, won four games, had no pro-bowlers on the offensive side, and Campbell spent a year being the best player on a very, very bad offensive football team.  In 2010, Campbell was traded to the Raiders, where he has struggled to clearly establish himself as the best option in a stable of passers that includes Bruce Gradkowski and Kyle Boller (spoiler: he’s the best option).  Campbell has gone 1-2 as a starter in Oakland, which doesn’t include a big comeback he staged over the struggling Chargers.

My purpose here is to jump in the time machine to late-September 2008, and try to determine how Campbell was attacking defenses when he was successful and had help vs. how he is being attacked by defensive coordinators now who, at present day, have Jason Campbell completely figured out.

When I went back and reviewed a game at Texas Stadium in 2008 between the Redskins and the Cowboys, the thing that stood out about Campbell was his accuracy and sense of timing.  It wasn’t often in that game that Campbell was getting deep into his reads, but he was adjusting when he needed to and most of those plays were coming out of a three step drop passing game where if Campbell wasn’t going to throw it to his pre-snap read, he needed to get it away to his second or third option very quickly.  The Redskins weren’t going to be able to protect him for four plus seconds.  The reason that these plays worked is because Campbell was able to move the chains almost entirely off of route concepts that put the defenses in a bind.  He was incredibly accurate with his passes in this game against the Cowboys.

However, most of Campbell’s completions in this game were short and quick.  When the Redskins were able to get downfield passes, they would drop Campbell deeper, which would change the aiming point for the defensive ends, helping offensive tackles Chris Samuels and Jon Jansen.  Campbell had assistance from receivers in adjusting hot to unblocked rushers for easy completions.  Campbell was two for two in throwing downfield because Santana Moss was working the void in the coverage and Campbell was extending plays by working up in a deep pocket away from defensive ends.

The pass protection was not great, but it didn’t need to be.  The route combinations were short, quick, and hard to follow for defensive backs.  The quarterback action was complicated: a lot of built in pump fakes and play action passes when the Redskins were trying to go down the field.  The Redskins were very limited in their use of the shotgun because they wanted to work quickly and change the angles of the edge rushers so that they couldn’t win their individual match-ups.

The biggest thing for Campbell was the amount of help his receivers Santana Moss and Antwaan Randle El provided him.  Chris Cooley was in pass protection a lot in that game, and so Jim Zorn put the game in the hands of his receivers and young quarterback.  He let them go out on early downs and move the ball efficiently to win the game.  Campbell responded with one of the best days he would have as quarterback because he got comfortable early.  The Redskins threw their first six passes short, then three unsuccessful deeper drops (two sacks and an incomplete).  Then they went back to the highly successful short stuff with great success for nine consecutive plays.  Campbell and Zorn were putting on a clinic.  Campbell was playing at a speed that the Cowboys couldn’t match.

Let’s fast forward to the present day, where Campbell and the Raiders are facing the 49ers.  After a 5 for 7 start for 28 yards which didn’t include a 9 yard scramble and a 46 yard pass interference penalty that was instrumental in putting the Raiders up 6-0.  From that point forward, Campbell would not complete a pass in the next two quarters (0-for-4), and finish the game on a 3-14 cold streak that would include two interceptions.  What gives?

The biggest difference was that present day Campbell does not play the game at a faster speed than the defense does.  Campbell was highly and often critiqued for his footwork and spotty passing accuracy as a west coast quarterback, but a sprained ankle suffered in the first game of the 2009 season could directly explain why these criticisms were legitimate.  The Redskins did not run very much west coast stuff in 2009, instead spending most of the season as a power-I formation rush offense that lacked an identity in the passing game.

In 2008, which included the Cowboys game, Jason Campbell had a single weakness in his game: he couldn’t convert third and long situations.  When the Cowboys had shut him down, it was because they forced the Redskins into long yardage situations, then made the Redskins drop deeper and try to get the ball at the sticks, where they could break down a weak pass protection unit and sack a hesitant Campbell.  He was sacked just twice in the Cowboys game, in 3rd and 9 and 3rd and 7.

Both of Campbell’s sacks in this 2010 game against the Niners came in first down situations.  One wasn’t a sack so much as it was a backwards lateral that missed Michael Bush.  The other was a horrible backside protection gaffe where the Raiders just kind of hoped they wouldn’t get blitzed off the backside with no hot receiver.  Campbell saved the Raiders from a number of sacks in this game, much like he had done for the Redskins two years before.  But unlike he did two years before, Campbell neither completed a majority of his passes, nor did he lead the Raiders to victory.  That’s the question here: did Jason Campbell regress as a quarterback?  Or is there something else at play here?

The biggest difference in Campbell of the last two years is actually an improvement.  When we talk about the ever-critical 3rd down play by quarterbacks, we’re talking about a weakness that Campbell had in 2008 that was skirted by Jim Zorn’s willingness to run successful passing plays on first and second downs, dictate to the defense, and stay out of long third downs, if not all third downs.  When you look at Campbell with the Raiders, it’s clear that the Raiders ask him to be a mature veteran who can help them convert third downs.  Third was his best down in 2009, and in this game against San Francisco, it was also his most productive down.  Campbell was called upon to throw on three of the team’s first four third down attempts, and although the pocket broke down on deep drops all three times, Campbell converted the first down twice with some great ad-libbing, both with his vision (finding Michael Bush, who had blown a block), and with his legs.

It was at that point that the Raiders made a curious decision to take the game out of Campbell’s hands on third down, running the ball with Michael Bush on the second drive until the 49ers stopped him, and then throwing a bubble screen to Jacoby Ford on the third drive.  Campbell converted a deep out to Johnnie Lee Higgins on 3rd and 7 on the Raiders fourth drive, but he was rules out of bounds.  After replays conclusively showed that Higgins caught Campbell’s pass on the sideline with both feet down, the Raiders punted, declining to challenge the call on the field.  That was Campbell’s last throwing attempt until the fourth quarter of the game, coming with five minutes remaining in the second quarter.  Campbell was just one of five on third downs in the fourth quarter, but that includes a drop by Michael Bush, a one-yard overthrow of Louis Murphy on a 50 yard pass down the sideline, and a dropped pass interception that hit Jacoby Ford between the “1” and the “2”.  Clearly, Campbell came prepared to convert third downs on this game.

The problem for the Raiders was too many unsuccessful 1st and 2nd downs, leading directly to the need to convert the third downs listed above.  When I went back to 2008, it was amazing how much the Redskins trusted Campbell in first and second down passes, and how pinpoint accurate he was on those passes.  It was a completely different story last Sunday.  Campbell was handed the ball 19 total times in first and second downs, and he just wasn’t very good.  Here is your breakdown:

• 1 pass interference penalty for 46 yards
• 1 interception
• 2 times sacked based on missed pass protection assignment
• 1 dropped pass called back by holding
• 1 pass knocked down at the line
• 3 QB scrambles for just 5 yards
• 1 other dropped pass
• 2 passes defensed
• 1 pass thrown away
• 6 passes completed for just 54 yards

This, quite obviously, is not a good use of 19 plays and — while a small sampling — is an argument that Jason Campbell may have regressed.  That’s a big reason why Campbell and the Raiders were in so many third downs over the course of that game.

A bigger reason may have been Michael Bush runs.  On first and second down, Bush rushed 16 times for just 35 yards, and one successful carry, which was his first.  The Raiders have decided that with Campbell as their quarterback, they are going to run in all first and second downs, and only pass when the game situation dictates it (i.e. they are losing in the fourth quarter).

It’s not that Campbell’s doing all this stuff wrong all of a sudden, as the next step in Campbell’s development would normally be to start taking big plays in the passing game, like he was able to do against the Chargers a week before.  The difference is that there is no longer a fundamental passing game staple in his offense.  When Campbell was successful as a Redskin, the team lived off of it’s three step drop passing game with multiple receivers in a west coast look.  But as things have started to go south in his career, his offenses have adopted a simplified run-first mentality.

This would be effective if the Redskins and the Raiders could actually run the ball, but we’re looking at a pair 3.0 yard average rushing attacks being asked to pace an entire offense because teams don’t feel like they can protect the quarterback.  The believe among league insiders is that Campbell has regressed, and that the speed of his reads has slowed to the point where he’s not getting to his 2nd or 3rd receivers in his progression.  That goes against the film, which suggests that Campbell is handling pass pressure and sorting out his reads as well or likely better than in 2008, where deeper drop coverages by the opponent could make Campbell hold the ball for the extra count.

Because of the ability flashed by Campbell to handle the responsibility of a timing west-coast styled passing game in 2008, there’s little evidence that Campbell has regressed when he is doing the best job of his career at handling critical third downs with maturity and without panic.  If it can be concluded that Jason Campbell has not regressed as an NFL quarterback as many say he has, then the responsibility for the decline in his statistics over the last two seasons needs to be placed on the Washington and Oakland football organizations for pairing him with teammates who cannot handle the speed of NFL offenses and keep their quarterback throwing in rhythm.

Oakland can expect to receive more from Campbell when and only when they commit to giving him what he needs to succeed.

FNQB: Evaluating Josh Freeman’s early 2010 success

Josh Freeman has already come a long way from his up-and-down 2009 season. This past week, he flashed onto all the highlight reels with late bullets down the sideline to Mike Williams and Michael Spurlock to set up a field goal in the 24-21 win over the Bengals. Are these plays just another flash, or will we see some sustained success out of Freeman this year?

Across most metrics, Freeman has vastly improved his game this year. After reaching seven yards per attempt in only half of his games in 2009, Freeman is averaging 7.1 YPA this year while completing just under 60% of his passes. His worst game came against Pittsburgh, but he still managed to complete 64.5% of throws. Freeman now lies at 13th among NFL passers in YPA and has most improved in the interception department. After throwing 20 interceptions in 2009 in less than 300 attempts, Freeman has so far only thrown three in 116 attempts.

Freeman has excelled in the Bucs new offensive system. Offensive coordinator Greg Olson implemented a version of the west coast offense that implemented a few more downfield throws and vertical routes. Freeman’s big arm and speed have been paramount to his success. Through the first four games, Freeman has managed to rush for 114 yards on only 12 attempts. He also has used his legs to extend plays and find his receivers, particularly Kellen Winslow. In terms of efficiency, Football Outsiders’ DVOA statistic shows that Freeman has been 9.8% above average in the passing game. If you need a further seal of approval, Greg said in his Week 3 Tale of the Tape that Freeman has continued to impress, even though he has gotten away with a few mistakes.

The competition has not been soft, either. Freeman hasn’t come up against a defense like the New York Jets he faced in 2009 when he went 14/33 for 93 yards, but all of the Bucs’ opponents rank highly in interceptions and opponent YPA except for the Browns.

Still, the Bucs are playing it safe with Freeman. He has thrown roughly 29 times per game, which ranks in the bottom third, and is rarely asked to pass when the Bucs are ahead. Unfortunately, the supporting cast leaves a lot to be desired. Carnell Willliams has been an ineffective rusher, but increased carries for Ernest Graham and the explosive LaGarrette Blount are on their way.

The Bucs wide receivers have been flashy, but not the most reliable options on the field. Despite rookie Mike Williams’ spectacular grabs, he still only catches 58% of balls thrown to him and only gains about 7.2 yards per target. Michael Spurlock, Sammie Stroughter and Arrelious Benn have all made some plays but will need some time to develop with Freeman. Freeman’s best assets in the passing game by far have been Kellen Winslow and Ernest Graham. Winslow has gained over eight yards per target while Graham has been instrumental in the passing game, catching ten balls for nearly 100 yards while scoring a touchdown. Both players are critical tools in the west coast system, and Freeman should excel if Williams can be refined into a reliable playmaker.

Freeman is a big reason for the Bucs 3-1 record and will also be a determining factor in their 2010 success given the state of the running game. Luckily for him, he won’t be facing too many tough challenges until a Week 12 game in Baltimore. I think the early signs indicate that Freeman will continue to improve with his team over the year, although a few bumps in the road would not be surprising. While I can’t say ‘Pro Bowl’ yet, it may come sooner than I and many others thought before.

FNQB: Does splitting carries improve running back performance?

Editor’s Note: This week, Brian is taking over the Friday Night slot at LiveBall Sports with a piece featuring proprietary research on the relationship between splitting carries and rushing efficiency — Greg

One nugget of conventional wisdom in football is that splitting carries between running backs will improve the overall running game by resting players, exploiting defensive weaknesses and keeping the opposing team off-guard. At least anecdotally, this season has seen fewer prominent featured backs and much more situations where players are splitting carries. The basic analysis in this article will not debunk or support that idea — nor should we seek such an absolute rule as teams differ in their philosophy and personnel and the landscape of the game is constantly changing.

To try to answer the question posed in the title, I compared the percentage of running back carries that went to the primary running back with the primary back’s DVOA so far through the 4 weeks of the season. This is an inherently flawed approach as injuries, opponents, lack of defensive adjustments and random variance have all added a lot of noise to the data. Nevertheless, any conclusions or hypotheses made can be looked at over a larger time frame and tested yet again to try to gain some understanding.

Results
Below is a chart where the featured back’s DVOA is plotted against the percentage of carries that back has received of his team’s total running back carries.

As expected, there is no clear trend line in one direction or there other. However, we can see four out of ten running backs who carry the ball above 75% of the time have a significantly negative DVOA below -10%. Of the ten backs that have received over 75% of their team’s running back carries, only 4 have been showed a positive DVOA. Of the other 22 teams who split carries more evenly, only two have a DVOA below -10% with eight performing at below average levels. Clearly, there is nothing that says a back who is featured prominently is bound to fail, but there is a slight trend. To gain a little more insight, we can look more closely at three groups I will call High Performers, Workhorses, and Duds.

High Performers
For the sake of this analysis, we’ll call the high performers any featured back with a higher than 20% DVOA on the year. The four who fit the criteria this year are Arian Foster, LaDainian Tomlinson, BenJarvus Green-Ellis and Mike Tolbert. Not exactly the list anyone would expect before the season started, eh? Here are their respective share of the carries and DVOA:

	Foster	Tomlinson	Green-Ellis	Tolbert
% of Carries	73%	55%	47%	47%
DVOA	29.7%	25.6%	34.8%	34%

It is interesting that, of the four, three were relatively unknowns going into this year and one was anything but unknown. Since we are so early into the season, there are a couple of explanations aside from the low workloads. One, these players “snuck up” on defenses who have not yet adjusted or prepared properly for these running backs. Two, since we are so early into the season, there is a high chance of statistical noise, especially considering the less-featured backs have relatively few carries. In either explanation, a look back into this relationship later in the season will be highly beneficial.

The Workhorses
We’ll call the workhorses any backs with over 80% of their team’s running back carries. So far this year, there have been seven such running backs: Adrian Peterson, Darren McFadden, Rashard Mendenhall, Chris Johnson, Maurice Jones-Drew, Frank Gore and Cedric Benson. This list is a bit more familiar names, but the performance thus far has been lacking:

	Peterson	McFadden	Mendenhall	Johnson	Jones-Drew	Gore	Benson
% of Carries	86%	83%	82%	86%	81%	94%	82%
DVOA	12.4%	7.1%	14.4%	-21.2%	-7.4%	-3.9%	-18.1%

The big surprise in this group is the twitter apologizing Chris Johnson who is coming off a huge workload of 354 carries and 50 receptions. Despite his 2,000 yards in 2009, he has been quite awful in terms of DVOA this year. While Cedric Benson had a lesser workload while still eclipsing 300 carries, he also was not the same rusher that Johnson was last year. It would be easy to conclude that splitting carries can improve performance on a multi-year basis due to player rest as there is also much work done on the impact of workload on a player. However, we may also see a bit of a trend that may correct itself over the course of this season as coaches feel pressure to give their prior season’s high performers a significant chunk of playing time. Once again, a look-in later in the season can give us a better look at the impact of a lot of carries.

The Duds
Finally, we get to look at the awful peformers thus far in the 2010 season who have posted a DVOA below -20% while receiving the most carries on their team. This year, those players have been Chris Johnson, who we have already looked at, Brandon Jackson, Carnell Williams and Matt Forte.

	Johnson	Jackson	Williams	Forte
% of Carries	86%	56%	76%	72%
DVOA	-21.2%	-35.5%	-31.7%	-44.8%

Here, we have a wide range of situations and level of carries. Johnson is the sole workhorse while Jackson is the only back sharing nearly 50% of carries. The best explanation for Forte and Jackson’s numbers is that they are simply not good rushers or are in terrible running environments. Last year they each respectively posted a -15.5% and -15.8% DVOA indicating that no amount of time splitting will make them into good performers. Carnell Williams was not so bad last year and significantly split carries, but we could be seeing his decline, some statistical variance or just a bad few weeks. The word is that he will start splitting carries this week, which will allow us to yet again look in later in the season and gain some insight.

Conclusions
On the surface, there appears to be evidence of a negative impact of a large workload on performance for running backs. Any evidence of splitting carries disrupting the ‘flow’ and hurting performance is not apparent at this time. Some backs, such as Adrian Peterson, have been resilient enough to continue a high level of play despite receiving a great deal of the carries for their team. A deeper look into this relationship later in the season as well as an analysis of the 2009 season will explore some of the issues and ideas raised in this article.

FNQB: Scheduling Effects

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After the first week of December, the 2009 Jacksonville Jaguars sat at 7-5 on the year and heading into their intra-state showdown with the Miami Dolphins, the Jags were on the verge of separating from other playoff teams in the AFC, including the Dolphins who were 6-6, and the teams would — as is standard — play for the wild card tiebreaker with each other.  A two game lead with three games to go would have been insurmountable, and it would have put the Jags just one game away from clinching a spot in the AFC playoffs with three to go.

The magnitude of this game reached a lot further than just the Jags and Dolphins.  The New York Jets would have needed to get to 10 wins to make the playoffs had the Jags got to nine, by virtue of losing a head to head game to Jacksonville.  They didn’t hold the tiebreaker against Miami either.  They were in trouble.

Then they played the game in Jacksonville, and Miami won — convincingly.

Neither Miami or Jacksonville would win again in 2009, and while their 7-6 records would have suggested otherwise, both teams knew they were in trouble because of effects of the schedule.  As comfortable as Jacksonville was as a 7-5 team, their next two games were against the undefeated Colts and on the road in frigid cold New England.  If they had lost both, the Week 17 game at Cleveland would be largely meaningless — the Jags weren’t making the postseason at 8-8.  Neither was Miami — they had a really good shot if they could stave off the NY Jets, but to do so would have meant wins against Houston and Pittsburgh in the seasons last two weeks.  As inconsistent as those teams had been all year, it’s hard to imagine any fringe team beating both of those teams in consecutive weeks.

Scheduling effects dictated this Week 14 Miami-Jacksonville game to be the pivotal match-up in the AFC playoff picture for the season, however, it was about the ninth most publicized game of that week.  The most critical non-divisional game in the regular season wasn’t even seen in it’s home market.

****

The NFL spends a lot of it’s time trying to craft a schedule that offers built in storylines every single week of the season — so there’s never a dull moment in this league.  They do a remarkable job.  But who are “they?”

*They* are a combination of league officials, competition committee members, and television representatives/executives.  They have more control over whether your team makes the postseason than your backup quarterback.  Every April, these representatives sit in a room and solve the NFL’s toughest logic puzzle.  They need to insure that they don’t make a mistake that sends a team on the road or at home four consecutive weeks in a row.  They are responsible for ensuring that one team doesn’t get a really early or really late bye week year after year after year.  They need to prepare the schedule from Week 10 and on so that if NBC chooses to “flex” a game to Sunday Night, as is their contractual right, the other networks that hold rights to Sunday coverage (CBS/FOX) can still find a matchup worthy of national coverage.  Because the worst thing that can happen to the NFL is for the nation to be caught watching Cleveland at Tampa Bay at a critical juncture of the playoff picture.

NFL Football provides such unique challenges to this group of schedule-ites that it’s beyond impressive that the schedule comes out largely balanced every year.  The NFL would easily sacrifice competitive balance in order to have a backup plan of showing Brett Favre to a national audience three times in the seasons final five weeks, and to also have a backup plan to the backup plan should Favre not play or be hurt at that point.  And somehow, with all of this playoff and Favrarian drama hanging in the balance, the league’s schedule is fair enough to allow the Detroit Lions to host the Minnesota Vikings and the Green Bay Packers in the final four weeks of the year, allowing for a small measure of parity as well.

This year, Roger Goodell passed a measure designed at getting teams like the Colts to quit resting starters at the end of the regular season, where they mandated that every team must play a team in their own division in Week 17.  To an extent, the NFL schedule was always built backwards (actually, it’s built from the byes out, but I digress), but this makes a successful schedule exponentially harder.

Still, the final product was just as flawless as it ever was.  I can pick a team at random, go to December, and find any number of interesting storylines to sell to a television audience as the sport gears up for it’s playoff season.  Take a team at random: the Rams.  On December 5th and December 12th, they go on the road in consecutive weeks to play the last two AFC Champs, Arizona and New Orleans.  Then they play their cross-state rival for the only time in the next four years: the K.C. Chiefs at home.  Then they finish up as a potential playoff spoiler in their own division (or, potentially, as a suitor for the division crown) against the 49ers and Seahawks.

Want to try another random team? *flips schedule pages*  The Colts, who normally play meaningless games in December, have a post-Thanksgiving home game with Dallas, and then four days later, a division showdown with Tennessee.  Even if the division is wrapped up at that point, they get the Jaguars and Raiders, who both will be in must wins at that point, and could struggle against whatever team the Colts have out there.  Then they finish with Tennessee again, of which the relevance will depend closely on the outcome of the Week 14 Thursday nighter.  Four of the Colts final six games are at home, and that’s not an accident: if they want to sell out those games, they’ll likely have to be willing to play Mr. Manning.

San Diego has used the end of their schedule to bail themselves out at the end of the last two seasons, and this year, they will have four divisional games in their final seven, including both games against primary competitor Denver.  The other three are no less compelling: Indianapolis, San Francisco, Cincinnati.

Three schedules picked at random, and clearly, there are compelling games at the end of the schedule, ensuring once again that this December will be just as competitive as all other Decembers, despite a mandate that forced schedule makers to work around using a divisional game in the final week of the season.

Seemingly, the solution was to take a move right out of the playbook of college football athletic directors.  You have more defined late-season conference plays to work around, and there’s going to be a weak team in every division, more or less, so you need to save the most compelling non-divisional rivalries for those late-November and December weeks when they are most needed.  The NFL will only benefit from elements of a college atmosphere around the time of bowl season.

****

With that said, can we find any teams that might have a disadvantage in schedule this year?  I’m looking for a disadvantage that might decide a division race.  Sure, we can look at the AFC South, who has to play the NFC East, and say that they are at a disadvantage (they are), but that’s not going to decide the race.  Something more substantial that could decide a race might be a team that plays a high percentage of it’s critical games in October before a bye week, when every team it plays comes off of a bye.

There are just a few examples.  Green Bay’s schedule is pretty unfriendly.  They have a Week 10 bye.  Leading up to that bye week, they have a must win game against Minnesota, then a road trip to New York to face the Jets, and a home game against the Cowboys.  Then after just one week off, Green Bay has to travel four out of the next five weeks, starting at Minnesota, and including Atlanta, Detroit, and New England.  That Detroit game is their one reprieve in the second half, but it’s tucked away in a part of the grind that greatly favors the home team, as the Lions play just one cold weather game all year, at Buffalo, when they could be favored.

The Lions, of course, have a very favorable schedule that could help Matthew Stafford break out.  Their final three division games are all at Ford Field, and all in December/January.  Their two road games in that month are to Florida.  Six of eight home games come after the bye, with one exception being a very beatable St. Louis team at the beginning of October.  If the Lions are going to win six to eight games, this schedule will be a big reason.

Also consider that though the AFC and NFC West divisions have been down for some time, they play each other this year.  The Easts do not play each other this year, and will travel further to play inter-conference games.  This would be a good season to bet on two NFC West teams making the postseason, because it means just three cross-country trips instead of the standard five.  Some of this effect is lost for Denver and San Francisco, who have to go to London to play each other, but the bye afterward should limit the cumulative effect of travel.

Oakland and Arizona sit in the pilot seat of favorable scheduling this year.  Oakland, amazingly, gets to play Denver the week before they go to London, Houston the week before Brian Cushing returns, and manage two of their three cross country trips the first week of the season (Tennessee), and right after the bye (Pittsburgh).  They might lose both of those games anyway, but have more than a week to prepare and travel, and just one win of the two could position the team well to stay relevant in the wild card race even if San Diego starts to pull away with the division.  Their schedule gets legitimately hard after the bye, but the Raiders haven’t had a winning record at the break since 2001.  They could be favored four or five times before the bye.  Arizona’s schedule starts road heavy with quality teams, but after an early bye, they don’t go past the Mississippi until December 19th at Carolina.  Their first eight weeks after the bye are about as soft as eight weeks can be, and should allow Matt Leinart to do damage should he hold the job through the bye: at Seattle, vs. Tampa Bay, at Minnesota, vs. Seattle, at Kansas City, vs. San Francisco, vs. St. Louis, vs. Denver.  That should put them in the playoffs.

In a few cases each year, quirks schedule make or break a team’s playoff hopes, but considering all that could be wrong about a 16 game schedule that features multiple international games each year, the job done to foster competition while satisfying the television producers and keeping the interest of the fans through four months is remarkable.  Schedule makers are the true geniuses of pro football.

FNQB: Parity and Talent Discrepancy in the NFL

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Parity and competitive balance.  These are principles that are credited for sports outcomes that either favor strong regression to the mean effects, or if there’s high volatility in year to year results.  Of course, regression and volatility are not parity.  A perfect instance of parity can only occur when all teams in a league are of the same true talent level.  We, as a sports media, liberally extend parity to include eras in sports where there is a strong illusion of parity.  Parity in results is known as competitive balance, thus, when things are accepted to be balanced, sports leagues are defined by their parity.

Many believe that the NFL is the first professional sports league to achieve parity.  This is accepted because you can look at the NBA, and see the vast concentration of titles in the hands of just three franchises, and you look at baseball, and their salary structure greatly favors a couple of “haves” in the northeast, the oldest of the franchises.  There is no geographical stronghold in professional football, and the financial disparities don’t translate into talent disparities on the field.  Thus, it is concluded that competitive balance is strong in the NFL.

In the late nineties and early aughts, this was probably more true than false.  In the 14 seasons between 1994 and 2007, eleven different teams won the Super Bowl.  Free agency and the a radical idea of salary cap had created strong competitive balance.  Free agency worked so well because there was a very finite amount of available free agents who could assist any given team in improving themselves, and not all free agents could help all teams.  It allowed individual players to find someone who would pay them without necessarily drawing a parallel between spending money and winning.

In the last six years, 2/3rds of NFL playoff berths are held by the top third of the NFL hierarchy.  The remaining third are held almost exclusively by a middle tier of teams.  The last third of NFL teams has combined for just three playoff berths in six seasons (the 2006 Chiefs, the 2004 Rams, and the 2008 Dolphins).  Since 2001, only six teams have won the super bowl, and the AFC in particular shows no parity: only four teams have represented the AFC in the Super Bowl.  One of those teams is the Raiders, who haven’t won so many as six games in a season since appearing in SB37.

If parity in the NFL isn’t dead, it’s declining in the NFC thanks to emerging powerhouses, and has been dead in the AFC for some time.  What has happened to parity, and why has it disappeared?  Will it re-appear?  And how do the CBA negotiations play into all of this.  Let us investigate.

Bad teams staying bad

The aforementioned Raiders have earned their 29-83 record since 2003.  The Lions haven’t been to the playoffs since 1999.

The rise of teams like the 1999 Rams, the 2001 Patriots, the 2003 Panthers, the 2008 Cardinals, and the 2009 Saints — teams that went to the super bowl a year after missing the playoffs — have conditioned fans to expect the unexpected.  Playoff team turnover tends to be in the 50% range year to year.  Extrapolated to extremes, these phenomena have been used to support the hypothesis that any team can make a run in any year — that neither talent nor past performance can predict future performance.

While there have been a handful of teams who have made the postseason following a “bad” year — defined by me as posting a Total DVOA worse than -10.1%, it was nearly impossible throughout the era of parity for a “really bad” (-20.1% or worse) team to make the postseason the next year.  Here’s a list of all the -10.1% teams who made the postseason the next year between 1997 and 2008:

• 2008 Bengals -19.3%
  2007 Falcons -26.5%
  2007 Dolphins -22.2%
  2007 Panthers -20.1%
  2007 Cardinals -11.6%
  2006 Buccaneers -20.0%
  2006 Seahawks -12.9%
  2005 Saints -22.5%
  2004 Bears -27.1%
  2003 Falcons -18.4%
  2003 Chargers -11.9%
  2002 Panthers -11.1%
  2001 Falcons -19.2%
  2001 Colts -11.4%
  2000 Bears -12.4%
  1999 Saints -39.0%
  1998 Redskins -20.5%
  1998 Colts -17.5%
  1998 Lions -13.1%
  1997 Bills -13.5%
  1997 Cardinals -21.0%

Between 1998 and 2004, only the 1998 Redskins and the 1999 Saints even made the postseason after having a “really bad” season.  Volatility in the DVOA results has increased since then, so we’ve come to expect one really bad team making the playoffs in the next year.

But 12 teams have to make the playoffs, and that represents almost 40% of the league.  We’ve seen a fair share of bad teams make the postseason in the years they were bad.  What if we raise the standard to eliminate teams that didn’t make the divisional round?

• 2007 Panthers -20.1%
  2007 Cardinals -11.6%
  2006 Seahawks -12.9%
  2005 Saints -22.5%
  2004 Bears -27.1%
  2003 Falcons -18.4%
  2002 Panthers -11.1%
  2001 Falcons -19.2%
  2000 Bears -12.4%
  1999 Saints -39.0%
  1998 Redskins -20.5%
  1997 Cardinals -21.0%

We still have the 1999 Saints and the 2004 Bears, who were really, really terrible teams, but we’ve now eliminated most of the worst teams on that list.  If we disallow teams that failed to win a postseason game, drop the 2000 and 2004 Bears, and the 2007 Panthers.  Those teams played well enough to get bye weeks the next season, but were blown out in the divisional round at home.

Now if we take it to the level of making an appearance in a conference championship game, we reach a pretty conclusive outcome:

• 2007 Cardinals -11.6%
  2005 Saints -22.5%
  2003 Falcons -18.4%
  2002 Panthers -11.1%

Those are the only four teams in the last twelve seasons to be legitimately “bad” teams, and then reach their conference championship game the next season.  Of course, three out of those four failed to post even an average DVOA in their conference championship season.  The exception, again, is the Katrina-displaced Saints.  The New Orleans Saints are the only franchise in this timeframe to make the playoffs after a dreadful (-30.1%) season, and they are the only team to get to the round of four with an above average regular season DVOA the year after posting a bad season.

In this way, parity never existed.  Bad teams used to almost never rebound enough to make the postseason.  Then with divisional realignment in 2002, bad teams started to get more of a chance, if they won a weak division.  In fact, the 2002 Falcons are the only team on the list post-realignment to follow a bad season with a wild card berth.  Terrible teams, with a lone exception or two are more or less dead in the water.  The NFL might have been known for parity, but clearly, bad teams have a tendency to stay bad.  If they happen to sneak into the postseason by posting a really good divisional record, their postseason fortunes tend to be even worse.

If there’s a surprise team that’s going to take home the hardware in 2010, it’s not going to be the Raiders, Seahawks, Rams, or Lions.  These teams are historically unlikely to make the postseason.

Superpowers and Dynasties

When the New England Patriots and Pittsburgh Steelers took five world titles of American football between then in just nine years, some pontificated on the death of parity.  It’s a superficial argument to be sure, after all, in the height of the era of parity, the Broncos and Patriots combined to win five titles in eight years, and the Cowboys and Patriots have both had 3-in-4 title runs* in the free agency era.

*Although Free Agency couldn’t have affected these dynasties differently.  The Cowboys dynasty was ultimately done in by free agency and the eventual aging of its superstars, whereas the Patriots would have been a one hit wonder if not for players like Rodney Harrison, Corey Dillon, Christian Fauria, Tyrone Poole, Keith Traylor, and Mike Vrabel.

Certainly though, there’s something of substance to the idea that most great teams don’t return as great teams after the offseason.  Here are all the instances since 1997-98 of a team either posting consecutive 20.1% DVOA seasons, or 2 seasons out of three above the same threshold:

-Teams who went 3+ consecutive years as a “great” team are noted in boldface.

• 2008-09 Baltimore Ravens
• 2008-09 Philadelphia Eagles
• 2007, 2009 New England Patriots
• 2006, 2008 Baltimore Ravens
• 2006, 2008 Philadelphia Eagles
• 2006-07 New England Patriots
• 2006-07 Jacksonville Jaguars
• 2005, 2007 Indianapolis Colts
• 2005-06 San Diego Chargers
• 2004, 2006 New England Patriots
• 2004, 2006 Philadelphia Eagles
• 2004, 2006 Baltimore Ravens
• 2004-05 Pittsburgh Steelers
• 2004-05 Denver Broncos
• 2003-05 Indianapolis Colts
• 2003, 2005 Kansas City Chiefs
• 2003-04 New England Patriots
• 2002, 2004 Philadelphia Eagles
• 2002-03 Kansas City Chiefs
• 2001-02 Philadelphia Eagles
• 2000-02 Tampa Bay Buccaneers
• 1999-02 Oakland Raiders
• 2000, 2002 Miami Dolphins
• 1999, 2001 St. Louis Rams
• 1998, 2000 Miami Dolphins
• 1997, 1999 Jacksonville Jaguars
• 1996-98 Denver Broncos
• 1993-98 San Francisco 49ers

There’s been an average of about six teams per year to qualify for this designation, but the teams that repeat are usually the same few teams every year.  The Ray Lewis Baltimore Ravens.  The Peyton Manning Colts.  The Belichick/Brady Patriots.  The Dungy/Kiffin Bucs.  The Gannon/Gruden Raiders.  Steve Young’s 49ers.  Elway’s Broncos.  The Johnson/Wannestedt Dolphins.  A brief appearance from the Shanahan/Plummer Broncos.

Two of the oddballs on this list: the Jacksonville Jaguars made it with two completely different personnel groups.  They appeared in the late-90’s with the Brunell/Coughlin/McCardell group, and then tore down, drafted Byron Leftwich, developed the young team, and then jumped back up to an elite level in the middle of the decade…with David Garrard in place of Leftwich first for injury, later for good.  The other oddity is that Dick Vermeil had a seven year run where teams he coached or teams he built were above the 20.1% figure in five of those seasons, as a coach over the age of 60.  Perhaps the other oddity is that the New York Jets never made it onto this list, but they have played in two conference championship games bookending this timeframe, and were a made field goal away from a third in 2004.  The New York Giants made the postseason four consecutive years from 2005 to 2008, but were a great team just once: 2008, when they made the super bowl run in January, and played great until about mid-December.

And if you think this is just a quarterback dominated list, consider this list of QBs of the most 20.1% or better DVOA teams in the last 15 years:

1. Steve Young, 6
2. Donovan McNabb, 6
3. Peyton Manning, 5
4. Tom Brady, 5
5. Rich Gannon, 4
6. Troy Aikman, 4
7. Brett Favre, 4
8. Steve McNair, 3 (2000, 2003 Titans; 2006 Ravens)
9. Mark Brunell, 3 (1997, 1999 Jaguars; 2005 Redskins)
10. John Elway, 3
11. Trent Green, 3

Is that anyone’s list of the best quarterbacks of the last 15 years?  Green Bay appears 5 times on the list three times going back to 1993, but one of those years was 2009 with Aaron Rodgers, and the Vikings didn’t quite make the threshold of a great team last year.  And it’s true that Favre didn’t play on a lot of great teams between 1998 and 2006.

In fact, the league hasn’t been quarterback driven over the last 17 years or so.  It’s been driven by short, mini-dynasties, but if I told you that the enduring franchises of the last decade were the Colts, the Raiders, and the Bucs, you’d take great issue with that assertion.  Yet, those are the only three teams in the last ten years to shake off the pitfalls of regression for longer than two years at a time.  The Ravens, Eagles, and Patriots have all been consistently excellent teams throughout the decade (and to a much lesser degree, the Steelers), and those teams, along with the Colts, are probably the teams of the decade, but if parity isn’t dying, it would be unreasonable to expect the Ravens and the Eagles to remain great teams for the third straight year.

Conclusions

Since the Colts have undergone a small, very quiet fall from the AFC’s elite (especially since they made it to 14-0 and the super bowl last year, though this SB loss will look much different in two years when the Colts aren’t a playoff team anymore), the Ravens, Eagles, and Patriots have been the controlling NFL teams in the past four NFL seasons.  In that timeframe, those teams have combined for 123 regular season wins, and ten playoff victories, just under one per year, per team.

It’s a testament to the parity of teams that those teams have combined for zero super bowl victories and just one appearance in those four seasons.  Parity in the playoff field appears to be at an all time high, although I’m not sure that’s necessarily the best form of parity.

It could be short lived.  Parity in the regular season is clearly dying, and in the case of really bad teams, never existed to begin with.  It’s becoming increasingly harder for 8-8 teams to get any better because in a zero sum game, someone has to fall to create room at the top.  And while teams have been unable to stave off the “down” year for long stretches, most teams (such as the Colts, Giants, Panthers, Chargers, etc) have figured out how to dominate their divisions even in a down year.  The Philip Rivers chargers haven’t been to the top of the DVOA leaderboards since 2006, but they’ve won their division each year against all odds, usually due to some crippling Broncos collapse.

I’ll write in the future about how football’s financial structure is contributing to keep small market poor drafting teams in the cellar year after year.  Hopefully by the time I get around to that, those teams get a new perspective that helps them start to win in the absence of parity: at the expense of someone else.

FNQB: How Much is a Draft Pick Worth? Part III

You’ll want to read the research done in part I and part II of this series before approaching this.  It’s deep stuff — especially for me — so you’ll be lost if you don’t.

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The main principles that were used in Part II of FNQB’s look at the cash value of an NFL Draft pick were the three variables listed below:

• Cost of using a draft choice, defined as the value of the first three years of the players contract, but acceptably estimated as the players’ signing bonus.
• Value to the franchise.  I estimated a marginal wins above replacement value (expected at about $9.6 million in current, obscenely player friendly, market conditions), and then averaged the contribution of first round draft choices since 2003 to come up with the 0.85 wins per year figure for a first round draft choice.  This is consistent to about 90% the expected value of receiving a veteran player in a trade for a first round draft pick.
• Negotiation power (in dollars) of a pick.  Picks can be traded for existing contracts, and if done so, the right of exclusive negotiation on these contracts can take the market value of a contract extension, and cut it by about 30% in the case of elite players.  That’s many millions of dollars saved, but at the first round level, it’s not expected to reach the level of the surplus value of the pick.

That last part is a little bit controversial.  If we can safely conclude that the surplus value of a first round NFL draft pick exceeds all comparable instances of money saved from trading a first round pick for an elite talent and signing an extension (and remember, Jay Cutler’s extension with Chicago was about $20 million less than his open market value  — that’s two first round picks at work there), then there would be no rational reason to trade first round draft picks for players.  They would be too valuable.

That’s not exactly true, though.  If we assume for a second that ALL football would cease to exist after the 2010 season, and that every play was going to be made within the context of two seasons, then the Jets would have been much better off beating Chicago’s price for Jay Cutler as opposed to drafting Mark Sanchez.  Because, if we’re not valuing Sanchez’ 2011-2013 seasons at the expected value for a first round quarterback, and rather we prorate his $28 million guarantee to just $11.5 million for two seasons, Sanchez is unlikely to provide much surplus value on that contract.

The reasoning is as follows: Sanchez wasn’t a remotely replacement level player in 2009.  That was to be expected with a rookie first round quarterback.  Sanchez is expected, however, to be much better this year.  Maybe better than Cutler (who was also bad).  But the surplus value on that $11.5 million is hardly existent, even if Sanchez is worth a win or more this season.  In a truncated football world, the cost of using that fifth overall pick on a player like Sanchez outweighs the return.  Trading that pick (plus an extra one) for Cutler saves the cost, and picks up a huge asset of a contract that can then be extended at a lower rate if they need to expect to play a 2011 season.   It doesn’t even matter that Sanchez might end up outperforming Cutler, because the Broncos have paid the cost of the pick on Cutlers contract, and the Jets would just owe a salary.

This, in essence, is the ‘win now’ philosophy encapsulated in a doomsday scenario.  A rational party would suggest that the Jets get more value on their draft choices (Sanchez and CB Kyle Wilson) than the Bears got for Cutler, but that presumes that all wins are created equal when this is very obviously not the case.  There are $25 million wins (such as the one the Bears failed to get over the Texans in Week 17 of 2008, missing the playoffs), and there are $0.2 million wins (such as the one the Bears got over the Detroit Lions in Week 17 of 2009).  The average comes out close to the expected value of a win, but it’s not hard to see which game the Bears needed Cutler the most.

In short: there are times where it makes sense to toss away the surplus value of a first round pick and go try to pick up a very valuable contract that can provide immediate dividends over a shorter amount of time.  Without context, however, it’s a losing proposition to trade a first round pick for a contractual asset, unless you’re getting an extreme value compared to recent trades.

But is this true of picks in other rounds as well? By extending the analysis to include 2nd, 3rd, and 4th round draft choices, we can evaluate the gradual decline of draft pick surplus value against the kind of return that trades of those picks return.  If, prior to round four, there’s a point where it is seemingly more profitable to deal the pick when the opportunity arises rather than use it, this is what we are looking for.

These are the established “costs” of a draft choice in 2009, independent of draft position:

• Round 1: $14.4 million (median: $10.1)
• Round 2: $2.13 million (median: $1.97)
• Round 3: $0.72 million (median: $0.72)
• Round 4: $0.46 million (median: $0.47)

NFL salaries are up 42% since 2000, due mostly to the 2006 CBA and the crazy amount of money that has been pumped into the game in the last decade.  Signing bonuses (guaranteed money) aren’t up nearly as much, and for players drafted in the 3rd round through the 7th round, they aren’t up at all since 2002.  It’s those players who are making a higher percentage on their rookie deals compared to ten years ago because minimum salary increases have accompanied those signing bonuses.  The 42% also accounts for the increase in the NFL rookie cap over time.

That number has jumped more than 42% inside the top six.  Michael Vick’s 2001 contract had a three year value of $15.3 million, and David Carr got $16.3 million the next year, according to SI.com.  Matt Ryan’s 3 year figure was $34 million, and Matthew Stafford’s is around $37 million.  For Sam Bradford’s contract, that figure seems conservative.  The NFL limits rookie salaries per team based on how many picks they have, but this hasn’t prevented top picks from getting mega bucks.  The average first round pick made $6.4 million in guaranteed money in 2002, and that’s now $14.4 million in 2009.

Performance, of course, remains largely unchanged.  With all the money in the game, a win is worth more now than it ever has been before, and teams obviously have to pay out the ear for those crucial wins.  Meanwhile, we’ve seen the top pick push past the break even point in surplus value in the last four years or so.  Furthermore, performance relative to draft position is a lot more linear than it was just seven seasons ago.

In terms of veteran talent, second round picks are the new first round picks, being thrown around more often these days, including for some of the following players.

• TE Kellen Winslow (0.0)
• TE Jeremy Shockey (0.0)
• CB DeAngelo Hall (1.0)
• QB Matt Cassel (o.5) and LB Mike Vrabel (1.0)
• DE Jason Taylor (1.0)
• QB Donovan McNabb plus 4th round pick (1.0)
• WR Brandon Marshall 2 2nd round picks (1.0)
• QB Matt Schaub 2 2nd round picks (1.5)
• WR Chris Chambers (0.0)
• DT Corey Williams (1.0)

Average: 0.67 wins per year per 2nd round pick

3rd round pick

• LB Kamerion Wimbley (1.0)
• CB Antonio Cromartie (0.5)
• WR Anquan Boldin (1.0)
• QB Brett Favre (1.0)
• DT Marcus Stroud (1.0)
• NT Shaun Rogers (1.0)
• RB Willis McGahee (-0.5) 2 3rd round picks
• NT Kris Jenkins (1.0)
• RB TJ Duckett (0.0)

Average: 0.6 wins per year per 3rd round pick

4th round pick

• CB Ellis Hobbs (0.5)
• CB Sheldon Brown (1.0)
• S Kerry Rhodes (1.0)
• QB Sage Rosenfels (0.0)
• RB Lorenzo Booker (0.0)
• QB Jason Campbell (1.0)
• LB Jonathon Vilma (1.5)
• CB Pac Man Jones (0.0)
• TE Anthony Fasano (0.5) and LB Akin Ayodele (0.5)

Average: 0.67 wins per year per 4th round pick

***

In reality, there doesn’t seem to be a big difference in the quality of player received for a mid round pick (be it 2nd, 3rd, or 4th), rather, the perception a team has of it’s own players (i.e. the Mangini Jets wanting nothing to do with Jonathon Vilma, and the Jason Campbell situation) greatly affects how much a team must pay for talent.  One think that’s clear is that first round picks (1.1 wins per year per pick) go a LOT further in the trade market in terms of how elite a player is than second, third, or fourth round pick does.

What the draft pick compensation does seem to affect is how favorable the contract is when acquired.  Up until 2010, a fourth round draft pick couldn’t net a player with more than a year on his contract: the team gained the right of exclusive negotation, but with players just a year from free agency, that wasn’t worth very much.  Jonathon Vilma had a strong 2008 season for the Saints, and then hit the market before resigning.  Not one of the players acquired for a 3rd or 4th round pick has ever been stuck with a franchise tag, either by the team trading them or acquiring their rights.  Matt Cassel and Corey Williams were both given the franchise tag, and then dealt for second round picks.  As explained a year ago in one of the first ever articles at this blog, Cassel’s franchise tag priced his extension WELL above the market rate for a backup who had won some games for the Patriots.

While it’s possible the market could have valued Matt Cassel more similar to super bowl champ Eli Manning than one fluke season of David Garrard, $30 million guaranteed was a flat overpay of a 5th year player with a limited history of success.  Matt Schaub made a similar investment work out, but was much better in 2007 than Cassel was in 2008.  With simple RFA tenders replacing franchise tag usage in this uncapped year, team investments in trade acquistions have fallen back to reasonable levels, increasing the value of a draft pick in a trade.

Of the 30 players listed above, 15 players were or have not been extended from the acquired contracts with a strong inverse correlation between age and extension.  Trading for a player with a franchise tag meant a larger contract than the draft compensation would have otherwise suggested.  There was a large difference between Matt Schaub’s practical $15 million guarantee, and Brandon Marshall’s practical $26.5 million (which drops to a Schaub-esque figure if Marshall gets suspended at any point before Week 1 of the 2012 season) even though both cost 2 2nd round picks.

Players who were extended tend to have deals comparable to mid-tier free agents, in the $6-$8 million per year range, even though these players are valued at a higher compensation level than mid-tier free agents.  In about 60% of the cases, having the right to negotiate saved a negligible amount of money, if that.  In the other six cases: Jason Campbell, Sage Rosenfels, Anquan Boldin, Matt Schaub, Brandon Marshall, and Kellen Winslow (all passing game components), Quarterbacks received up to 50% less than they would have made on the open market, and the Dolphins and Bucs both received $6 to $8 million more in first three years risk compensation than they would have been able to in free agency.  Boldin had a team friendly contract, and clearly met the Ravens in the middle.

In the aggregate, trading a 2nd, 3rd, or 4th round pick saves about 18% of the total contract value, down from roughly 30% on the first round pick.  If the average functional 3-year guarantee on sub-elite level players is $16-$22, and $6-$8 million of that is saved, based on the quality of the player, that’s a pretty big chunk of that player surplus that’s being saved.  Of course, from that $6 million figure, we need to subtract the replacement cost of signing a veteran to do the same task, so what we’re really looking at is $5 million dollars value saved by trading a mid round pick instead of using it.  This is largely consistent across the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th rounds.  This figure is down from the $8 million dollars of market value saved by trading a first round pick.

We can then establish the holding value of the pick before it is spent or traded by adding that $5 million to the cost of using the pick, established above:

• Round 1: $8 million – $14.4 million = ($6.4 million)
• Round 2: $5 million – $2.13 million = $2.87 million
• Round 3: $5 million – $0.72 million = $4.28 million
• Round 4: $5 million – $0.46 million = $4.54 million

This reverse value added trend is made possible by the fact that more valuable draft picks DO NOT bring better players in trades, and certainly not according to a cost scale, so teams save more money (surplus independent) if they trade away their higher draft picks vs. their mid round picks.  It creates better cash flows to build your team entirely out of 2nd-7th round picks, and undrafted free agents.

But surplus value is a primary driver of value creation for the franchise.  And 3rd/4th round picks just don’t bring in the player value of the first two picks.  On average, 3rd round picks turn into quality starters about half the time, superstars at no greater a rate than late rounders.  4th rounders turn into starters about one-third of the time.  For third rounders, that’s a win estimate of 0.55/year for three years, or $15.84 million.  For fourth rounders, the win estimate is about 0.37/year for three years, or $10.66 million.  That can be straight added to our value-added equation to demonstrate the money value of a mid round pick:

• 3rd round: $4.28 million +$15.84 million = $20.12 million
• 4th round: $4.54 million + $10.66 million = $15.2 million

The second round estimate is a little trickier, since you could give the benefit of three years or four years on the average rookie deal, given that 3 year contracts for second rounders are non-existent.  I will play it in the middle here and use a 3.5 year estimate, and a win factor of about 0.72/year.

• 2nd round: $2.87 million + $24.19 million = $27.1 million

Because of the massive difference in cost between a second round pick and a first round pick, the difference between the cash value of a teams first round choice and it’s second round choice is only about $6 million.  This supports the conclusions made by Massey/Thaler in 2003 that 2nd round picks are undervalued (based on a higher surplus at the time).  Even though the number of picks difference between the middle of the first round and middle of the second, and the middle of the second to the middle of the third, second round picks are almost as valuable as first round picks if they could be bought.

Conclusion

The main point in this research is that all draft picks are valuable.  Trade value of a pick falls off considerably after the 4th round — into the $1-$2 million range, but teams that piss away their late round draft picks on flyers on injured players are still costing themselves about double that amount in franchise value.  It’s just not a risk worth taking.

Additionally, teams don’t want to trade for first round draft picks anymore because to get even value, one franchise must trade it’s cornerstone player to another franchise.  The market may adjust to this someday, but the next time you see a veteran player traded out of a city where he has a large reputation, and a pundit remarks that “that’s just the way the game is these days”, feel confident in the fact that the game isn’t like that at all.  Great players in their prime don’t get traded anymore in $50 million value transfer trades for first round picks.  That’s essentially what separated the Jay Cutler trade from the Matt Cassel trade.

In today’s market, the total worth of a player like Tom Brady, his history, his future, his contract, is about a single first round pick.  If he signs a mega extension with the Patriots, he’s no longer even worth that much.  There would be more than a few franchises who would gladly give up a first round pick just to have Brady for this season only, but those franchises are outnumbered by the ones who wouldn’t.  A trade that dominates headlines for weeks is no longer worth a first round pick in franchise value, and until the market conditions change and draft picks begin to cost more, teams are foolish to trade them for returns that wouldn’t be panned as strongly in the favor of the team receiving veterans.

Teams in the NFL want to win.  If they didn’t, they’d be willing to trade a first round draft pick for two fourths and a sixth.  The NFL value chart is build less on the concept of value, and more on the concept of getting winning players.  It’s not an efficient model, but as long as first and second round picks deliver the playoff wins and the Lombardi Trophy, the fans and players just don’t care.

FNQB: How Much $ is a Draft Pick Worth? Part II

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Last Friday, I was able to draw up a pretty good estimate of the market premium spent in free agency to overbid other teams for elite players versus what the same player would make either resigning with his current team, or forcing a trade in which another contender pays draft compensation for his exclusive negotiating rights for a year (i.e. the franchise tender).  I estimated that number at about $8 million in “first three years” money.

What percentage of the total guaranteed money that is really depends on the size of the total contract, which depends on the quality of the player.  Giants DL Chris Canty, who was a target of the Redskins prior to landing Haynesworth, got $22 million of his $42 million in the first three years of his contract, which is a very player friendly deal for a guy who would be best described as a second-tier NFL star.  If there had been no bidding by any of those teams, but rather a trade by the Redskins for the Cowboys’ end (work with me) for a 2nd and a 5th rounder, Canty isn’t getting $22 million in the first three years.  He’s probably getting $14 to $16 million.  His asking price ups from $5 million a season to $8 million a year on the open market with multiple suitors.

One way or another, it’s those valuable draft picks that allow teams to save that money.  The NFL salary cap long prevented franchises from both holding on to their draft picks and using them, and spending mega bucks to outbid the wealthiest teams for the best players.  The Redskins have long tried to leverage their draft choices into cheaper contracts for veteran help, and Haynesworth was a very different route when the team was trying to protect it’s picks after trading for Jason Taylor.

Today, I’m trying to determine the true value of those picks.  It’s established that picks, which all have an inherent expected value in the players they return, can be traded to save money on other contracts.  The tricky part is that the teams that save the most money are the ones that accrue the most picks.  With the exception of the top 5 or 6 picks in the NFL draft, the cost of paying a player’s first contract via the draft is far less expensive than paying a comparable veteran to take that roster spot and lineup spot.  Even in the top five, the expected value of the pick is greater than the expected value of the contract, although the success stories are few and far between, and teams have to be smart — pitfalls in the first five picks of the draft are both well documented and incredibly damaging to the long term welfare of a franchise.

Those are two ways that draft picks provide value.  The third way is through the variance of the players picked: teams that can consistently outdraft the expected value have more value in draft picks, those that are consistently outdrafted by the average have less value.  This analysis will ignore this variable.  By taking the monetary value difference between the contract for a draft pick and a contract for a player who provides the same expected value, and adding the amount saved by trading the pick for a veteran player, while subtracting the difference between those two uses — as not to double count the value — we’ll come to an acceptable “value of a draft pick” figure.  Part III of this analysis will attempt to differentiate value by location in the draft.  Right now, we will concern ourselves with the value of a generic, first round draft choice.

FNQB: How Much $ Is a Draft Pick Worth? Part I

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At the point when the Redskins signed DT Albert Haynesworth to a contract worth in excess of $12 million a year, guaranteed over the first three years of the deal, it actually seemed like a bit of a steal.  When it comes to acquiring an elite player, you either have to develop him yourself, or you have to pay well above what many would consider a “reasonable” price tag.  The Redskins realized that a truly elite player qualifies for free agency once every eight to ten years.  Reggie White was an elite free agent.  Drew Brees was a pro bowl quarterback in free agency, but many feared he would never play effectively again because of a surgically repaired shoulder.

Then Redskins VP of Football Ops Vinny Cerrato has a pretty simple team building philosophy: younger, and better.  He wasn’t concerned with matching players to any scheme, figuring he had coaches to make it all work.  Haynesworth was perfect.  He was younger than incumbent no. 1 DT Cornelius Griffin, he was younger than linemates Phillip Daniels, Renaldo Wynn, and Andre Carter.  And he was a highly regarded defensive tackle…players like this simply never hit free agency.  The Redskins acquired the league’s best defensive tackle without so much as giving up a seventh round pick.

Of course, they gave up a lot of dollars, and as it continues to play out, the team now looks like the one guy caught holding the bag when the cops come.  Haynesworth had a typically strong 2009 season — he was awesome in short yardage situations — but he ended up light in the statistical categories by which fans (improperly) grade DTs: sacks, tackles, and forced fumbles.  And the team finished 4-12, meaning that they didn’t get all that much out of Haynesworth’s dominance.  Haynesworth then decided that the team’s methodology for training players in the offseason didn’t work, and that he would have to work out on his own to get himself back in the best shape.  Of course, the Redskins decided the same when they fired their coaching staff and brought in Mike Shanahan — who stressed and then demanded full participation in offseason work.  Haynesworth didn’t show up, and now has requested a trade, and while he figures to show up for training camp, this money situation is going to get very ugly before it’s settled.

One thing that everyone can agree on now is that the Redskins would have much less of a headache if they had simply avoided the player-friendly price tag and went forward trying to develop their own talent at the position.  That’s easy to save now.  The bigger question is — without the benefit of hindsight — how much money did the Redskins save by signing Haynesworth, and saving themselves a draft pick at the position?  In another FNQB edition, I’ll attempt to take the next step and answer the question of how much money a typical draft pick is worth.

To start, let’s propose a hypothetical: a sign and trade.  However, to better illustrate a point, I’m going to avoid using the Redskins altogether.  Most teams aren’t in the financial situation the Redskins are, and most teams value their draft picks better.  One team that we know, for sure, was in on the Haynesworth bidding, probably at a number greater than what Washington had offered, was the smaller market Tampa Bay Buccaneers.

If Tennessee had decided to trade Haynesworth to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers in an agreement to use their franchise tag on him, he probably would have brought future (in this case 2010) first round considerations, as well as a mid round pick.  This is big because it would not have impeded the ability of the Bucs to draft their quarterback, Josh Freeman, and really, it wouldn’t have changed much at all except the make-up of the DT position in Tampa right now.  For that package, a third in 2009 and a first in 2010, the Bucs would have had Haynesworth for the 2009 season, and the right to negotiate an exclusive contract with him over the next year.  Since, reportedly, the Bucs had offered Haynesworth more than the Redskins did, we’ll work off the assumption that the market rate for Haynesworth was $42 million guaranteed over the first three years, and then a relatively cheap fourth year up to 4/$48 before some meaningless non-guaranteed money in his age 32, 33, and 34 seasons.  Those are just the numbers we have, and the more speculation I can cut out of the analysis, the more accurate this effort will be.

Nnamdi Asomugha actually bested the Haynesworth deal, getting a $45 million deal for just three years, in part because the Raiders had little leverage with him other than crazy bucks.  Other recent defensive extensions of note include: Texans LB Demeco Ryans is going to get about $9 million over the first three years of his deal from the Texans, Colts DE Dwight Freeney who got $10 million/year for the first three years of his deal, NTs Vince Wilfork ($8+ million) and Marcus Stroud ($7 million), Saints LB Jonathon Vilma (just under $8 million), and Steelers LB James Harrison’s deal which is worth about $7 million per year.  Cowboys LB DeMarcus Ware’s deal is for just a fraction under Haynesworth: $40 million (compared to $42) in the first three years, and 4/$45 before the renegotiation point (compared to 4/$48).  Patrick Willis’ deal is similarly frontloaded, and worth more than $10 million per year in the first three years, as are recent cornerback extensions of Dallas’ Terence Newman and Carolina’s Chris Gamble.

The consensus is that elite players that aren’t especially young can seem to pull in between $7 and $10 million a year unless they have the benefit of the open market and free agency to drive up the price.  DeMarcus Ware and Nnamdi Asomugha are the exceptions: they asked for the same kind of money that Haynesworth and Julius Peppers requested, but managed to get their organizations to pony up for their services w/o having access to several offers.  Ignoring the outliers, I can argue that going back to the Bucs hypothetical, a sign and trade type deal would save them — at a cost of $10.3 million/year — about $3.7 million dollars in guaranteed money per year over the first three years of the deal for the exact same years of Haynesworth’s career.  In other words, the money premium that that Redskins paid to get Haynesworth over a similar player who would have costed draft pick value to earn negotiating right over is equal to $11 million dollars prorated over three years.

That $11 million offers no increase in player skill, but merely keeping the draft pick(s) offers the ability to add another player (or two) at a rate below market, which theoretically cuts into the value of that $11 million by some amount.  Our third round pick is going to average about 1 million dollars annually on his rookie contract.  Using some comparable second contract values for players already on your roster, it appears the going two-year rate for players already on your roster — but who aren’t drawing much, if any, free agent interest — lies in the range of $6-$7 million over the first two years of the deal.  New Orleans WR Devery Henderson, Washington QB Todd Collins, and Steelers S Ryan Clark all fall in this range.

There’s no direct monetary advantage to having the extra first round pick — as in our Bucs scenario — so the prorated annual money saved number for avoiding the free agent market premium for an elite defensive free agent is going to be about $8 million dollars, prorated annually over the first three years of the deal.  It’s meaningful, but not a crushing amount.

It would be wrong to conclude there and suggest that the only kind of value in professional football comes from dollars, however, this is going to be our baseline for next Friday’s analysis: if, instead of trying to outbid the Washington Redskins for Haynesworth’s services, they were able to negotiate a sign-and-trade deal with Tennessee, the Bucs could have expected their elite free agent plus $8 million dollars additional to spend on football operations at some point between 2009 and 2011.

Next Friday’s analysis will center around two things: how the Tampa Bay Bucs franchise would be different if they had acquired a player such as Haynesworth in 2010, and whether or not they are just better off with Gerald McCoy as their first round choice in 2010.  Specifically, I’ll look at player value outside of the money, and see if the total package really makes acquiring an elite free agent a move that doesn’t always make a lot of sense, and the value of young talent with developmental upside over the allure of the players who are already dominant.

FNQB: Sacks by Defensive Tackles Aren’t Worth Much

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Edge rushers in professional football run up the big sack totals, and well, if that left a lot of sacks for non-edge rushers, there would be a whole lot more offensive lineman, 3rd down backs, and offensive coordinators out of work.  I’ll begin with a table of all 5.0+ sack seasons that didn’t come from edge rushers over the last four years:

2008-09

Year	Player	Sacks	Year	Player	Sacks
2009	Randy Starks	7.0	2008	Kevin Williams	8.5
2009	Calais Campbell	7.0	2008	Albert Haynesworth	8.5
2009	Trevor Pryce	6.5	2008	Richard Seymour	8.0
2009	Shaun Ellis	6.5	2008	Bradie James	8.0
2009	Kevin Williams	6.0	2008	Jay Ratliff	7.5
2009	Justin Smith	6.0	2008	Aaron Smith	5.5
2009	Jay Ratliff	6.0	2008	Brandon Mebane	5.5
2009	Jonathon Babineaux	6.0	2008	Chad Greenway	5.5
2009	David Harris	5.5	2008	Fred Robbins	5.5
2009	Mike Wright	5.0	2008	Lawrence Timmons	5.5
2009	Vonnie Holliday	5.0	2008	Jason Jones	5.0
2009	Clark Haggans	5.0	2008	Tommie Harris	5.0
2009	Tony Brown	5.0	xx	xxxxx	xxxxx
2009	Anthony Hargrove	5.0	xx	xxxxx	xxxxx

2006-07

Year	Player	Sacks	Year	Player	Sacks
2007	Darnell Dockett	9.0	2006	Warren Sapp	10.0
2007	Tommie Harris	9.0	2006	Bart Scott	9.5
2007	Will Witherspoon	7.0	2006	Karlos Dansby	8.0
2007	Shaun Rogers	7.0	2006	Ty Warren	7.5
2007	Corey Williams	7.0	2006	Jarvis Green	7.5
2007	Bryant Young	6.5	2006	Corey Williams	7.0
2007	Jarvis Green	6.5	2006	Luis Castillo	7.0
2007	James Farrior	6.5	2006	Brandon Moore	6.5
2007	Albert Haynesworth	6.0	2006	Darwin Walker	6.0
2007	Jovan Haye	6.0	2006	Clark Haggans	6.0
2007	La’Roi Glover	6.0	2006	Rod Coleman	6.0
2007	Fred Robbins	5.5	2006	Bryant Young	5.5
2007	Amobi Okoye	5.5	2006	Brian Young	5.5
2007	Marcus Washington	5.0	2006	Fred Robbins	5.5
2007	Brian Urlacher	5.0	2006	Brett Keisel	5.5
2007	Ben Leber	5.0	2006	La’Roi Glover	5.5
2007	David Harris	5.0	2006	Chris Draft	5.5
2007	Shaun Ellis	5.0	2006	Adrian Wilson	5.0
xx	xxxxx	xxxxx	2006	Kevin Williams	5.0
xx	xxxxx	xxxxx	2006	Kerry Rhodes	5.0
xx	xxxxx	xxxxx	2006	Ray Lewis	5.0
xx	xxxxx	xxxxx	2006	Tommie Harris	5.0
xx	xxxxx	xxxxx	2006	Shaun Ellis	5.0

The 2009 season featured an explosion of sacks by 3-4 defensive ends.  Since 2006, we’ve seen a strong decline in sacks by interior linebackers and defensive backs.  The defensive backs aren’t getting sacks because the strong safety position is going away.  The inside linebackers…well, more teams are playing the 3-4, so it’s not that.  I’m thinking that it’s because of a preference to dictate match-ups that is leading to sacks in the 3-4 being offered to defensive lineman, while the amount of sacks by interior players in the 4-3 is declining so much.

Williams, Ratliff and Babineaux are the defensive tackles who scored 6+ sacks in 2009, and Tony Brown and Anthony Hargrove chipped in another five each.  Seeing Williams and Ratliff near the top of this list is nothing new, and their teams have been struggling in pass defense for year.  Add in Babineaux, and you have three players who all had excellent years, and no pass defenses who finished in the black, according to DVOA in 2009.  The Cowboys had an excellent pass defense in the second half of the year, but you’ll notice that Jay Ratliff only had two sacks after week eight, both against Casey Rabach of Washington, possibly the most plodding center in the NFL.  He did get a sack on Favre when the Cowboys were massacred in the playoffs.

Tony Hargrove was not a starter on New Orleans, he was an interior rusher in the nickel package, and his defense was the only NFL defense to rank in the top half in pass D, and have an interior rusher (inside the tackle) with 5.0 sacks in 2009.

In past years, defenses had been successful against the pass with interior rushers who put up the big sack numbers, but on those teams, you still had really good pass rush production from the edges as well.  The 2008 Titans had 23 sacks from players not named Albert Haynesworth.  Ends Jared Allen and Ray Edwards combined from 19.5 sacks as the edge, plus another 5.5 from Greenway, for their 2008 pass defense.  Brandon Mebane had an awesome year for a horrendous Seattle defense that year.

Why aren’t teams that create sacks from interior lineman actually creating a good pass defense?  The answer, in my opinion, is that a sack by a defensive tackle tends not to be a very bad outcome for the offense.  Typically, it’s not a loss of as many yards as a sack from the edges, it comes to come disproportionately on third downs and later on in plays after the defense has already won all of the mini-battles earlier in the play.  It usually amounts to a throw away, a net loss of 2 to 4 yards and a punt.  Your interior line is a waste of your pass rushing specialists, and defensive tackles almost never come unblocked.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, defensive tackles almost never generate many forced fumbles, while edge rushers lead the league every year.

While running backs always get criticized for their forced fumbles, the players that defenses can predictably strip the football from are quarterbacks and their receivers.  Defensive backs who rank highly in forced fumbles every year don’t get those numbers by putting their head on the ball with a running back in the open field, they get those numbers by stripping receivers after the catch: Charles Woodson and Charles Tillman have done this throughout their careers.  Defensive front players don’t ever find themselves matched up against those receivers who are fumble risks, so there’s only one way to get those consistently high FF numbers: get to the quarterback, and knock the football on the ground.

I can make you a complete list with defensive tackles with three or more forced fumbles in a season in 2009, and it’s not going to take nearly as much time to explain as with the sacks list: Tony Brown.  Expanding that list to include those with two forced fumbles would include more than 27% of all defensive players in the NFL and…3 defensive tackles.  You’ve now added John Henderson, Darrell Reid, and Pat Williams (as well as 5-techniques Justin Smith and Vonnie Holliday). In 2008, 3 forced fumbles from the interior was a more inclusive group, this time including teammates Haynesworth and Jason Jones, as well has hybrid rush-end-rush-tackle Raheem Brock of the Colts.  Add another 4 guys, including Mebane, when you expand that list two include two guys with 3 forced fumbles.  Also include: a fifth of all defensive players.

Interior players can’t do anything to generate big plays, really, they just have to go out there and be solid play after play, as their only way to create value.  It’s not that a sack by Kevin Williams or Albert Haynesworth or Jay Ratliff isn’t valuable, but more along the lines that it doesn’t add a lot of value to their already dominant player profiles.

There’s also no evidence — outside of the 2008 Titans — to suggest that having a good pass rushing interior tackle does anything to significantly alter the numbers of the edge rushers on the same team.  On the other hand, new evidence — provided here by Aaron Schatz of Football Outsiders (Insider required) — shows that there’s reason to think that having multiple quality edge rushers might increase the overall sack and hurry production by the unit.  We already know from past research that having two quality pass defenders on the edges in the secondary creates a multiplier effect of sorts for pass defenses.

Maybe, someday, we’ll do research on DT tandems against the run, or NT-ILB tandems, and find that they have a multiplier effect versus the run. Defensive tackle is still one of the most influential players on the field, and probably has more effect on run defenses than any other player on the defense.  It’s also probably a strong net positive effect to have a defensive tackle who can disrupt a line from the interior and collapse a pocket.

What the evidence says is that, in third down and other obvious passing situations, the best pass rushers a team has should be coming from the edge, because if any player is going to make a game changing play on defense; they are probably playing on the edges of the defense.  High sack totals from the defensive tackle position mean more when you already have two strong pass rushing ends, but at that point, they still don’t mean as much as the coverage unit with regards to overall team success.  If it comes down to spending money or high draft position on defense, fill the edge rushing positions, if possible, and then look to cheaper methods to find the very best players that you can put on the interior.